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COPYRIGHT
FACTUAL COMPILATIONS AND THE SECOND
CIRCUIT
Beryl R. Jones*
American authors1 rely on the protections of copyright law
to ensure financial benefits from their labors. Copyright law,
they perceive, protects their financial interests by preventing
others from copying their works or making substantially similar
copies. As a result of the Second Circuit's decision in Financial
Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investment, Inc.,2 many authors of
comprehensive nonfiction compilations 3 have no such assurance.
In Moody's, the Second Circuit, reaffirming a decision from its
previous term, Eckes v. Card Prices Update, held that a factual
compilation is copyrightable only if the author has exercised
some selectivity with respect to the data or has arranged the
data in a distinctive manner.
The Moody's case also raises the interesting question of
whether an author who is compiling a copyrightable comprehen-
sive compilation can receive protection for portions of the work
if they are released periodically with the intention that they will
later be gathered together to form the compilation. The issue
* Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
1 The term "author" is used in this article, as it is used in both the U.S. Constitu-
tion and the federal copyright statutes, to encompass any individual who has created a
work that may be subject to copyright protection, regardless of the nature of the work.
The term, therefore, covers creators of books, paintings, symphonies, computer pro-
grams, etc. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, III US. 53, 57-58 (184) ("An
author. . is he to whom anything owes its origin; originator, maker;, one who completes
a work of science or literature," (citation omitted) (emphasis added)); 1 NIMMEm, Niu-
bMR ON COPYRIGHT, § 1.06 (1985) [hereinafter Nusua].
2 751 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1984).
3 The terms "factual compilations" or "nonfiction compilations" are us in this
article to refer to compilations which are comprised principally of factual data, such as
telephone directories, in contrast with compilations of works written by others, such as
anthologies of English literature.
4 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984).
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was noted but not decided by the Second Circuit because it re-
manded the case for further factfinding.
This Commentary argues that the Second Circuit's view
that in order for a nonfiction compilation to be protected the
author must have made some qualitative judgments about the
selection of the data is not warranted by the constitution, the
federal copyright statute,' or prior case precedent.7 Further, this
standard may preclude many factual compilations from receiv-
ing protection under federal copyright law and will provide very
limited protection for works that are covered. In addition, this
Commentary discusses the serialization of material intended for
compilation and argues that this process should not render the
material copyrightable.
I. THE Moody's AND Eckes CASES
A. Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's
Financial Information, Inc. (FII), a publisher of financial in-
formation, published a "Financial Daily Called Bond Service"
(the Bond Service). The Bond Service was a daily service which
reported up to date information on all municipal and corporate
bonds, both foreign and domestic, that were to be redeemed or
"called" by their issuers.8
The Bond Service consisted of the following items: 4" x 6"
index cards (bond cards), which were mailed on a daily basis to
Bond Service subscribers in packets of approximately ten bond
cards; a filing cabinet to hold the bond cards; and an annual cu-
mulative volume. Each bond card listed the name of an issuing
authority, the series of the bonds being called, the type and in-
terest rate of the bonds, the date and price of redemption, and
the name of the trustee or paying agent to whom the bond
should be presented for payment.9 At the end of each year, FII
published a cumulative volume by editing, alphabetizing, and
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 [hereinafter the copyright clause]. See text accompany-
ing notes 104-07 infra.
6 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982). See text accompanying notes 93-94 infra.
' See text accompanying notes 97-102 infra.
8 751 F.2d at 502; Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 1984
Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 1 25,617, at 18,762 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding for defendant after
trial) [hereinafter FII/Dist. Ct. I1].
1 751 F.2d at 502; 1984 Copyright L. Rep. at 18,762.
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pasting together all the bond cards for that year. The cumula-
tive volume was registered with the Copyright Office, and copy-
right notices were placed on each bond card."0
Moody's Investors Service, Inc. (Moody's) was also a pub-
lisher of financial information. Among its publications was the
Municipal and Government News Manual (the Manual), which
was supplemented on a bi-weekly basis with Municipal and Gov-
ernment News Reports (the News Reports). The Manual and
the News Reports were comprehensive works which contained
financial information about various government entities, includ-
ing information about municipal bond redemptions, ratings of
debt securities, and notices of recently offered securities. The
News Reports were not arranged in the manner adopted by FH,
but rather in a newspaper format listing updates by subject mat-
ter, such as call notices or sinking fund notices." Within the sec-
tion on call notices, the material was listed alphabetically by is-
suer. Following the name of each issuing authority, Moody's
supplied the same information on called bonds as FII did, for
example, the series of the bonds being called, the type and inter-
est rate of the bonds, and the date and price of redemption.
Moody's, in contrast to Fil, did not provide information on all
government entities that redeemed bonds. Moody's coverage was
extended only to those municipal securities that it also rated,
which were approximately 90% of all municipal bonds.2
Most of the subscribers to FII's and Moody's services were
large financial institutions that were not equipped to keep track
of call notices because there was no uniform place in which the
notices were published. Since issuers stop paying interest on
bonds as of the redemption date, timely information about bond
redemptions is of considerable value to their holders. 3
In 1980, FH began to suspect that Moody's was copying
10 1984 Copyright L. Rep. at 18,762.
" See Exhibit 1-1980 N. 4, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment, Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Sery,
Inc., 751 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1984).
12 751 F.2d at 503.
13 Call notices are generally published in a vast number of newspapers and financial
publications. According to FH, it collected the information reported in its Bond Service
by having its personnel regularly check public notices and advertisements in at least
twenty publications. FH was on the mailing list of many issuers and redemption agents;
it made periodic follow-up telephone calls and had regular correspondence with many of
these entities. 599 F. Supp. 994, 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) [hereinafter FllDist. Ct. 1].
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FII's data on called bonds when it noticed "a coincidence of
Moody's errata publishing after FII's."14 In order to verify its
suspicion, FII, in December 1980, included an intentional error
in its bond cards. The error was picked up and published by
Moody's. Subsequently, FII checked to see whether Moody's had
copied any of FII's accidental errors. FII's check showed that
seven of the ten errors FII had made in 1980 were reproduced by
Moody's and that all eight of FII's 1981 errors were copied.1
The statistical evidence produced at trial1 6 showed that Moody's
had engaged in "substantial, if not wholesale copying" of FII's
work - at least forty to fifty percent of FII's work had been
copied.1
FII brought suit charging that Moody's had copied FII's
bond cards in violation of the Copyright Act of 1976 (the 1976
Act)18 and in violation of New York State's unfair competition/
misappropriation law. 9 The district court found FII's bond
" Moody's, 751 F.2d at 503.
15 Id.
10 FII presented expert testimony by Professor Herbert Robbins, Professor of Math-
ematical Statistics at Columbia University. Id. at 503.
11 Id. at 509.
'8 17 U.S.C..§§ 101-914 (1982).
19 The doctrine of misappropriation, a branch of the tort of unfair competition, was
first adopted in International News Service v. Associated Press, Inc., 248 U.S. 215 (1918)
(decided before Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), analyzing federal
common law). Associated Press challenged INS's practice of securing "hot" news items
from early editions of Associated Press's members' East Coast newspapers and distribut-
ing the news in INS's papers the same day on the West Coast of the United States. The
Supreme Court held the practice unlawful, although it noted that Associated Press's
news matter was not copyrighted. The Court prohibited INS from appropriating the
news in Associated Press's papers "'until its commercial value as news to [Associated
Press] and all of its members has passed away.'" 248 U.S. at 245-46 (quoting injunction
issued by district court).
The rationale of the International News Service decision was adopted by the courts
of several states. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 134 N.J. Super. 368,
377, 341 A.2d 348, 353 (1975); Mercury Record Prod., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc.,
64 Wis. 2d 163, 218 N.W.2d 705, 710-11 (1974). See also Baird, Common Law Intellec-
tual Property and the Legacy of International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U.
CHL L. REv. 411, 421-23 (1983). The misappropriation doctrine has not been universally
adopted. See Development in the Law: Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. REv. 890, 934-35
(1964). The misappropriation doctrine was adopted in New York, and extended to cover
claims involving entities who were not in direct competition. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n,
Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 795-96, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 491-92
(Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't 1951). This later exten-
sion has not been adopted in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., NFL v. Governor of Delaware,
435 F. Supp. 1372, 1377 (D. Del. 1977).
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cards were copyrightable. 20 The court, however, found that FII
had not established that Moody's had copied a substantial
amount of FH's work,21 and that even if Moody's had copied
Fi's work, and the copying was of sufficient quantity and qual-
ity that would ordinarily be impermissible, Moody's was
shielded from liability because the copying fell within the "fair
use" exception of the 1976 Act.22 The court further held the evi-
20 FII/Dist. Ct. II, 1984 Copyright L. Rep. at 18,766.
21 Apparently the district court was persuaded by the evidence of "independent cre-
ation" which had been submitted by Moody's. Id. at 18,763. The court noted that "tihe
evidence showed that Moody's subscribes to more sources from which it may obtain ba-
sic information on bond redemptions than does plaintiff." Id. at 18,763.
In the standard copyright case based on a claim of improper copying, the plaintiff
has the burden of proving that the works of the plaintiff and the defendant contain
substantial similarities and that the similarities are the result of the defendant having
copied the plaintiff's work. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54
(2d Cir. 1936), afT'd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940). The defendant may rebut the claim of infringe-
ment by showing that although the works were similar, the similarities were not the
result of the defendant having copied the plaintiff's work, rather, the defendant's work
was the result of independent creation. See Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art
Exchange, Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978). Cf. Selle v.
Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984) (plaintiffs evidence must be sufficient to show
second writing was not independently created).
Moody's, in rebuttal, submitted considerable evidence to show that its New-s Reports
were independently created. According to the testimony of Moody's employees, over two
dozen newspapers and wire services were reviewed; nine employees were directly, al-
though not exclusively, involved in the News Reports; and Moody's research costs varied
from $700,000 to $1,000,000 a year. Moody's also attempted to show that because of
publication deadlines and schedules more than half of its bond redemption notices sim-
ply could not have been copied from FIL. Moody's, 751 F.2d at 503.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). American copyright law has always given the copyright
owner the exclusive right to use his work in certain ways, e.g., distribution and reproduc-
tion. Under certain circumstances, however, the nature of the defendant's use may be
such that a use which would otherwise be deemed an infringement of the plaintiff's
rights is permitted. This exception is the doctrine of "fair use."
The use of factual materials in an author's work has been permitted in a variety of
circumstances under the fair use doctrine. See, e.g., Consumers Union of U.., Inc. v.
General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1983) (use in advertisements), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 100 (1984); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 36
F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966) (use in historical or biographical material); Keep Thomson
Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957, 961 (D.N.H. 1978)
(political speech); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (use in the analysis of events of public importance); Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1354 (Ct. CL 1973) (research), affd by an equally divided
court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). But cf. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 105
S. Ct. 2218 (1985) (denying defendant's fair use claim for its appropriation of portions of
an autobiography of President Ford).
The fair use doctrine was at first a judicially created doctrine. It wis incorporated
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dence did not establish that FII and Moody's competed and
thus FII, whatever the extent of the copying, could not bring an
unfair competition/misappropriation claim.23
The Second Circuit reversed and remanded the case for fur-
ther factfinding. It rejected the district court's conclusion that
Moody's had not copied a substantial amount of FII's work,2 ' as
well as its conclusions that such copying would fit under the fair
use exception of the 1976 Act.25 It also rejected the district
court's finding that FII and Moody's were not competitors
into the 1976 Act in section 107. HR REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976)
[hereinafter 1976 HousE REPORT] ("Section 107 is intended to restate the present judi-
cial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.").
The district court held Moody's use to be a fair use. It reached that decision based
on its conclusions that the commercial nature of the News Reports was neutral in the
fair use analysis; the News Reports served a "public function," because they made
needed financial information available; the factual nature of the Bond Service meant the
level of permitted fair use copying was greater than for a creative work; Moody's had not
copied a substantial amount of FII's work; and there was no evidence that Moody's use
of FII's materials would diminish or prejudice the market for the Bond Service. FIlDist.
Ct. II, 1984 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) q 25,617, at 18,765-67.
22 Id. at 18,766-67.
2 FII's expert, Professor Robbins, had testified that "it was more than 95% certain
that Moody's had copied at least 40-50% of FII's information in 1980 and 1981." He
testified further that in 1981 there was a 51% probability that Moody's had copied 91%
of FII's information and a 95% probability that Moody's had copied at least 68% of the
material. 751 F.2d at 503. The district court had rejected the testimony of Professor
Robbins concluding that one could not "make the leap that 8 of 8 proven instances
shows copying . . . 91% of the time" and found Moody's had copied in some 20-24 in-
stances throughout a given year or a rate of 1-2%. FII/Dist. Ct. II, 1984 Copyright L.
Rep. T 25,617, at 18,766; 751 F.2d at 509.
The Second Circuit did not accept the district court's view of Professor Robbins'
testimony, stating:
Professor Robbins did not testify that 91% was copied, he merely presented a
continuum of what Moody's might have copied from FII, expressed along with
the probability or "confidence level" associated with each possible copying
level The 91% figure referred to was, as appellant readily concedes, at the
"statistical fringe." More to the point was Professor Robbins's testimony that
it was statistically certain (i.e., 95-99% probable) that Moody's had copied at
the 40-50% level.
751 F.2d at 509.
21 Relying on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Uni-
versal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), the Second Circuit held that the commer-
cial nature of the News Reports rendered Moody's use presumptively unfair and that the
remaining factors considered by the district court also weighed against Moody's use. The
Second Circuit found the noncreative nature of the Bond Service not to be significant
because the News Reports were noncreative as well. It found Moody's copying was sub-
stantial, see note 24, supra, and it found that Moody's work could harm FYI's economic
use of its Bond Service. 751 F.2d at 509-10.
[Vol. 52: 679
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within the requirements of the misappropriation doctrine.20 In
the course of discussing whether FH's work was copyrightable,
the court acknowledged that its view on the issue of what made
a factual compilation copyrightable, first articulated in Eckes v.
Card Prices Update, was a "particularly restrictive" one which,
although protecting the selection and arrangement of data in a
factual compilation, did not extend any protection to the effort
or intellectual endeavor of collecting the data.2
The circuit court remanded for further fact-finding and
analysis in light of its opinion. It directed the district court to
review the following issues: whether the bond cards were copy-
rightable; whether Moody's copying constituted an infringement
under the 1976 Act; and whether FII's unfair competition/mis-
appropriation claim was preempted.28 On remand the district
court held that Moody's copying was not infringing because the
bond cards were not copyrightable and held that the unfair com-
petition/misappropriation claim was preempted. 0
B. Eckes v. Card Prices Update
In Eckes,30 the plaintiffs were authors of a book entitled the
"Sport American Baseball Card Price Guide" (the Guide). The
Guide, a soft-covered book, was a comprehensive listing of base-
ball cards manufactured in the United States from 1909 to
21 The court noted that if Moody's had been unable to copy from the bond cards,
FIT might have been in a position to license the use oi" the information on the cards for a
fee. 751 F.2d at 510.
751 F.2d at 506 (quoting Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862.63 (2d
Cir. 1984)).
28 Id. at 510. Given the Second Circuit's holding that the state claim was not pre-
cluded because FIT and Moody's were sufficiently competitive, the issue of whether the
state claim had been preempted by the 1976 Act resurfaced. Under section 301 of the
1976 Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982), state protection which extends to works within the
subject matter of the federal copyright statute is preempted if it provides for rights that
are equivalent to those granted under the 1976 Act.
In Moody's, the Second Circuit held that if FIT's copyright claim was valid, the state
claim would be preempted, 751 F.2d at 510, apparently reasoning that the two remedies
would cover the same subject matter and provide equivalent rights. It held further, how-
ever, that if FIT's copyright claim did not prevail, "the state claim [would] have to be
considered." Id.
29 Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Ser., Inc., No. 81 Civ. 6001
(S.D.N.Y. July 10, 1986) [hereinafter FII/Dist. Ct. III].
736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984).
1986]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
1979.31 The Guide was the first of its kind, listing eighteen thou-
sand baseball cards and the market price for the cards. The
Guide was arranged by manufacturer in tables of approximately
one hundred sets of cards.2 The going market price for each
card in either mint, good/excellent, or fair/good condition was
listed.3 3 In addition, the authors devised a classification system
that divided the cards into two groups: "premium" or "star"
cards and "common" cards.3 The authors of the Guide selected
and designated, on their own, five thousand cards as premium or
star cards.
The Guide apparently became the authoritative source for
baseball cards. 5 After its publication, the defendants began to
publish a monthly publication, "Card Prices Update" (the Up-
date). This publication updated the price of premium baseball
card prices, in newspaper format. The arrangement and price of
the cards in the Update was similar to that employed in the
Guide, 6 and the five thousand cards listed in the Update were
substantially the same as the five thousand cards listed as pre-
mium cards in the Guide.37
The plaintiffs brought suit asserting that the defendants
had copied their work in violation of the 1976 Act. The plaintiffs
were unsuccessful in the district court.38 The Second Circuit re-
versed. It held that in designating five thousand cards as pre-
31 Id. at 860.
32 Each set included all of the cards of the same type or design produced by a par-
ticular manufacturer during a specific calendar year. Within the sets, the cards were
listed chronologically with their numerical sequence within the set. Eckes v. Suffolk Col-
lectables, 575 F. Supp. 459, 462 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
33 Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d at 860.
-1 Premium cards are more valuable because of some distinguishing feature, such as
the player, the team, or a printing imperfection. For example, a 1952 Topps Chewing
Gum Company card featuring Mickey Mantle was reported to be worth $800. Id.
" Eckes v. Suffolk Collectables, 575 F. Supp. at 463.
" The Update, in contrast to the Guide, listed only one price per card. However, on
the inside cover of the Update was a "Condition Guide," which provided percentage mul-
tipliers that could be used to determine the actual price of a card in light of its specific
condition. Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d at 861.
37 Id.
" The district court held that the similarities in the arrangements of the two works
were dictated by the similarities of the information contained in the works, see text ac-
companying notes 54-57 infra, and that the plaintiffs had not established that the de-
fendants had copied the plaintiffs' prices or the plaintiffs' selection of premium cards.
Therefore the plaintiffs had not established that their copyright had been violated.
Eckes v. Suffolk Collectables, 575 F. Supp. at 463-64.
[Vol. 52: 679
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mium cards the plaintiffs exhibited sufficient selectivity to merit
protection under the 1976 Act; the defendants had copied this
selection; and the copying was prohibited under the 1976 Act."
IE. PROTECTION OF FACTUAL COMPILATIONS
A. The Issues
The two major issues raised by the Moody's and Eckes deci-
sions are what protection the 1976 Act provides to authors of
factual compilations and whether the author of an annual direc-
tory can secure protection for components of the work, if he re-
leases the components throughout the year with the intention of
ultimately collecting the parts into an annual volume.
The 1976 Act, like earlier American copyright statutes,'0
provides a limited monopoly to authors of a vast array of writ-
ings, 1 preventing others from using the works' 2 during the term
of the authors' copyrights. 3 Copyright protection has always
been extended to nonfiction works, including maps, digests, di-
rectories, and other nonfiction compilations.4 As far as factual
39 Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d at 863-64.
40 The first American copyright statute was enacted in 1790. ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124
(1790) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). The statute was
amended twenty-five times between 1789 and 1904. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 209
n12 (1954). Many of these amendments expanded the statute's coverage. See, e.g., ch.
36, 2 Stat. 171 (1802) (extending coverage to engravings and etchings). The statute was
revised in 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) [hereinafter the 1909 Act]. The coverage
provided in the 1909 Act was also extended by several amendments See, e.g., ch. 356, 37
Stat. 488 (1912) (extending coverage to motion pictures, reproductions of works of art);
and Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (extending coverage to sound recordings).
The 1909 Act was revised in 1976. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat
2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982)). The coverage provided
by the 1976 Act has also been extended by amendments. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 9M517, §
10, 94 Stat. 3028 (1980) (extending coverage to computer programs); Pub. L, No. 98-620,
98 Stat. 3335 (1984) (providing for coverage of semiconductor chip products).
"I The term "writings" is used in this article, as it is in the US. Constitution, to
encompass any work which is subject to federal copyright protection, including books,
musical compositions, paintings and statues. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,
561 (1973); 1 Num t, supra note 1, § 1.081C)[21.
42 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501 (1982).
4" The term provided under the 1976 Act is the life of the author plus fifty years, or
up to one hundred years for anonymous and pseudonymous works and works for hire. 17
U.S.C. § 302 (1982).
"' The first copyright statute awarded the monopoly of printing an selling to the
"author and authors of any map, chart, book or books." Ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
The first major revision of the federal copyright statute, the 1909 Act, provided specific
protection for "cyclopedic works, directories, gazetteers and other compilations." Ch.
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compilations are concerned, however, the nature and extent of
the monopoly has always been difficult for courts to define. If
the monopoly is too expansive, it will unduly restrict the ability
of others to build upon and utilize the knowledge revealed by
the author. If the monopoly is too limited, it will not provide a
sufficient economic incentive to encourage the production of
nonfiction works.
Neither the courts nor commentators have developed a uni-
versally accepted theory or methodology for ascertaining the na-
ture of the protection provided to factual compilations or the
amount of material that may be borrowed from earlier works on
the same subject. The Supreme Court has provided little guid-
ance in this area and specifically left the issues open in its 1985
decision in Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises.5 In Moody's
and Eckes, the Second Circuit entered the debate and set forth
a standard which provides only limited copyright protection.
B. Constitutional Grant
1. Promotion of the Arts and Sciences
The copyright clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that
"Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries.'4
As the words of the copyright clause indicate, the purpose
of copyright protection is the promotion of the arts and sciences
by the bestowal of a temporary monopoly sufficient to ensure
authors adequate opportunity to realize an economic return on
their creative efforts, thereby encouraging them to produce new
works. The broader the monopoly, the greater the potential for
economic reward and thus the greater the incentive to create
new works. In this manner creative efforts in the arts and sci-
ences are encouraged.'7
320, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909). The 1976 Act provides specific protection for compilations.
17 U.S.C. § 103 (1982).
45 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (1985) ("[TIhe law is currently unsettled regarding the ways
in which uncopyrightable elements combine with the author's original contributions to
form protected expression.").
46 U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
47 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
[Vol. 52:679
FACTUAL COMPILATIONS
A competing concern is the recognition that free and unre-
strained access to the works of others encourages a greater dis-
persion of knowledge, and this wider dispersion hastens the de-
velopment or discovery of new ideas and theories.4 For example,
Newton built on the works of Kepler who in turn built on the
works of Copernicus and Tychro. If each of these scientists had
been required to rediscover the scientific principles contained in
the written works of his predecessor, it is possible that science
would not have progressed much beyond the discoveries of Co-
pernicus. The monopoly must therefore be one which gives a
sufficient incentive to create new writings, yet is not so restric-
tive that new works cannot or will not be created. 4
The copyright clause attempts to strike a balance between
these competing concerns by providing a grant that does not in-
clude a monopoly on the facts or ideas contained in an author's
work. 50 The author's monopoly is restricted to the form in which
This justification for the copyright clause is the only one recognized by the courts or
Congress and has been recognized to the exclusion of any other theory. As the House
Judiciary Committee commented in 1909 in its report on the 1909 Act:
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the
Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his
writings... but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served
and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors
for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.
HR REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909) [hereinafter 1909 Houss RronT].
While the courts and Congress have never recognized a natural right to copyright,
many commentators, including the Register of Copyrights, have argued that authors
have a property interest in their work which exists independently of any societal benefit.
This right, it is argued, is protectable under the copyright clause. See Rzeowr OF mm
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON TE GENERAL REvISION OF Ti US. Co PRIM" LAw FoR ma
HousE CoMm ON EE JuDicIARy, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (Comm. Print 1961). See also
Chaffee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLULA L REv. 503, 508-07 (1945).
45 See Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright, 84 HARv. L. REv. 281, 313-21, 350-41
(1970) (arguing for limitations on the copyright monopoly). See also Hoehling v. Univer-
sal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972,980 (2d Cir.) ("Knowledge is expanded... by grant-
ing new authors of historical works a relatively free hand to build upon the work of their
predecessors."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
4" See 1909 HousE REPORT, supra note 47, at 7, which states:
In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider ... two questions: -
First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the
public; and second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the
public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under the proper terms and con-
ditions, confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of a tempo-
rary monopoly.
50 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1880). See also 1 Ntmml, supra note 1, §§
2.03[D], 2.03[E].
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the ideas or facts are contained. 51 The 1976 Act expressly limits
the scope of an author's monopoly, excluding from coverage
"any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, con-
cept, principle, or discovery. . described, explained, illustrated
or embodied in [the] work. ' '52
A corollary of this principle is the rule that authors may not
prevent others from copying the manner in which the ideas or
the facts are expressed, if the manner of expression is dictated
by the nature of the material or information contained in the
works. Otherwise, authors would effectively be able to secure
monopolies on the information or methods contained in their
works. For example, in Baker v. Selden53 the Supreme Court
held that the plaintiff's accounting forms were not infringed by
the defendant's forms which were copied from forms in the
plaintiff's book. The Court reasoned that the copying was neces-
sary in order to utilize the new accounting system described in
the plaintiff's book.5 4 Similarly, in Morrissey v. Procter & Gam-
ble Co. 5 5 the First Circuit held that the set of rules drafted by
the plaintiff for a sales promotional contest were not infringed
by the defendant's work.56 The court reasoned that the form of
expression chosen by the plaintiff was dictated by the content of
the rules and that if the plaintiff were able to prevent others
from using his form of expression he would be able to prevent
others from having a similar contest, a result not permitted
" See text accompanying notes 58-60 infra.
12 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). See 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 22, at 56 ("Copy-
right does not preclude others from using the ideas or information revealed by the au-
thor's work."). The 1976 Act contains the first explicit statutory statement of this princi-
ple, although it had been held to have been embodied in previous versions of the
copyright statute. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. at 102.
53 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
54 Id. at 107. The holding in Baker v. Selden is unclear. The case his been inter-
preted as meaning either that the accounting forms were not copyrightable or that the
forms were copyrightable and that only an exact or near duplication of the forms would
be prohibited. Compare Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702, 704-05 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958) (Baker holds that the forms were not copyright-
able) with Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (Baker holds that the defendant's
variations of the plaintiff's forms were acceptable). The underlying rationale is clear: a
writing may be used to the extent necessary to make use of the system described or
contained in the writing. See Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright,
29 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 560, 579 (1982).
11 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
" Id. at 679.
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under the federal copyright law.5 7
The difficulties this principle presents for authors of factual
compilations is clear. They cannot prevent others from indepen-
dently producing works that contain materials that are very sim-
ilar to or even duplicative of the materials in their work. Fur-
thermore, if the arrangement of the material in a compilation is
dictated by the subject matter, the author cannot prevent others
from using a similar arrangement. Thus, for example, anyone
can write a comprehensive guide to American automobiles pro-
duced from 1980-85. The first author of such a guide cannot gain
a monopoly on the data in the guide. In addition, if the first
guide was arranged by model, manufacture, or year of make, the
author could not prevent others from making another guide ar-
ranged in a similar manner. A second author, therefore, could,
after reviewing the first guide, research the field on his own and
produce a book identical to the first author's guide.
The problems underlying the application of this principle to
factual compilations have been compounded by the fact that
much of the language employed is more suitably applied in the
context of works of fiction and the visual arts and is often ap-
plied only with difficulty to nonfictional works."' The most oft
repeated articulation of the principle is the statement that the
author's "ideas" are not covered by the monopoly, only the "ex-
pression" of the ideas is covered. 9 The application in works of
"2 Id. at 678-79. See also Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736
F.2d 485, 488-89 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984) (plaintiffs copyright
on book on how to win at Scrabble not violated; defendant's similar structure necessary
because of similar subject matter); 1 NimmER, supra note 1, at §§ 2.18[A]-2.18[D]. Cf.
Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938) (charts for analyzing handwritings not
dictated by subject matter).
Courts relying on this principle have also limited the protection sought by authors of
historical material, arguing that although the sequence of events might be protected in a
fictional work, see Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.
1936), the sequence is not protectable when it is dictated by the actual chronology of
historical events. See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d
Cir. 1980). See also Oxford Book Co., Inc. v. College Entrance Book Co., Inc., 93 F.2d
688, 691-92 (2d Cir. 1938) (selection of events to be discussed in history text necessarily
similar because of similarity of subject matter).
"Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d at 862. See also Gorman, Copyright Pro-
tection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1569, 1570
(1963).
"1 See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The similarity
to be assessed must concern the expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves .... .";
1976 HousE REPoRT, supra note 22, at 61 ("Wide departure or variations from the copy-
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fiction can be straightforward. For example, the author of the
first story of a damsel rescued from the clutches of an evil figure
by a handsome man would be unable to prevent others from us-
ing this idea. The stories of Popeye, Olive Oyl and Bluto; Bruce
Cabot, Fay Wray and King Kong; and the prince, the witch, and
Sleeping Beauty; would be considered permissible variations.
However, a later writing that incorporated a significant amount
of particular aspects of the story, its "expression" - specific
words, characters, personality traits, sequence of events, mood,
locale, and scenes - would infringe the work. 0
The idea/expression dichotomy, however useful in evaluat-
ing works of fiction,6' is often of little assistance in analyzing the
degree of protection afforded the writer of a factual compilation
as it does not provide any mechanism for ascertaining what is or
is not protected. As noted above, much of what might be
deemed the "expression" in these works - the language or ar-
rangement of the work - is often dictated by the subject
matter.
2. Originality
The copyright clause demands some measure of originality
from the author. The term originality as used in the copyright
clause does not include any element of inventiveness; rather it
simply means that some element in the work must originate
with the author, i.e., it is created by the author.62  Thus, a
righted works would still be an infringement as long as the author's 'expression' rather
than merely the author's 'ideas' are taken."). See also Chaffee, supra note 47, at 513-14
("I like to say that the protection covers the 'pattern' of the work ... the sequence of
events, and the development of the interplay of characters.").
60 See Sheldon v. Metro-GoIdwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1936);
Musto v. Meyer, 434 F. Supp. 32, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), afl'd mem., 598 F.2d 609 (2d Cir.
1979).
61 It has often been noted that this language is even difficult to apply to fiction
works. See, e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d
Cir. 1960) ("Obviously no principle can be stated as to when an imitator his gone beyond
copying the 'idea', and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably,
be ad hoc.").
" Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59-60 (1884). The original-
ity requirement for copyright is substantially less restrictive than the novelty require-
ment in patent law, see 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982), even though the constitutional authority
to enact legislation covering copyrights and patents are contained in the same clause.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See text accompanying note 46 supra. Under the patent
statute, protection may be extended only when the subject matter of the patent has not
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painter may not obtain a copyright on a duplicate of Leonardo
da Vinci's Mona Lisa.6 3 He must add something original to his
copy of the portrait. He may, for example, change her hair color
and the background, and have her as only one of several figures
looking at a vista. This new work would meet the originality
requirement."
This originality requirement generally presents no special
problem for the compiler of factual information. He need only
produce a work that has not been copied in its entirety from the
copyrighted work of another. Thus, both the first and second au-
thors of the 1980-85 automobile guides discussed above would
meet this consitutional requirement.
3. Creativity
The Constitution's copyright clause does not extend protec-
tion to any work that is the result of an individual's intellectual
endeavors. It does not, for example, prevent the copying or utili-
zation of the results of the scientific endeavors of others - it
does not bar the copying of a new machine or invention. It does
not prevent someone from reaping the benefits of the explora-
been previously discovered and when the subject matter of the new work was not obvou3
to someone schooled in the art. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 US. 1, 11-12 (1966).
In contrast, copyright protection may be extended to someone who has independently
created a similar work, see text accompanying notes 50-51 supra, and may be extended
to a work regardless of whether or not it represents a significant or meaningful advance
in the art. See Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2D 159, 161 (2d Cir.
1927); Dorane v. Sunset House Distrib. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940, 944 (S.D. Cal. 1961),
affd, 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962). But see Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887 (1971) (Douglas,
J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (arguing that the copyright monopoly should
be limited, as with patents, to works that have "novelty").
63 The Mona Lisa may be freely copied by anyone. No one owns any copyrights in
the painting which would prevent its being freely copied. It is in the public domain.
Some courts have found the requisite originality in the author's reproduction of an older
work in a different medium, see, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191
F.2d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1951) (reproductions of paintings by old masters by the mezzotint
method), or the reproduction of a work in a different scale, see, e.g., Alva Studio3, Inc. v.
Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (reduction of Rodin's "Hand of God").
See Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1980); L.
Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857
(1976). But see Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304-05 (7th Cir. 1983) (plate
design produced by merging elements from several photographs not sufficiently original).
The copyright would extend only to the final picture and the new elements created. The
author would not be able to prevent others from reproducing the Mona Lia itself. See
Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
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tive efforts of another - the discovery of new territories may be
freely reported. It does not prevent the utilization of the product
of another's industriousness that does not result in the creation
of a new writing - the copying of a previously hidden work of
an ancient author is not barred even though its discovery is the
result of someone's deep thought and long investigative labors.05
The copyright clause protects only those intellectual products
that are the result of the "creative intellectual or aesthetic la-
bor" of an author.66 This limitation, the creativity requirement,
is different from the constitutional requirement of originality.
Creativity refers to the type of input by the author, whereas
originality refers to the source of the author's contribution. 1
The copyright statutes have also been interpreted as requiring
the input of some creative skill before a work can obtain copy-
right protection.'
However obvious it may be in some cases that a writing
does or does not meet the creativity requirement, the issue be-
comes more difficult with works such as factual compilations. In
these cases the form of the work created is similar to works that
are protected, but the manner of its production is dissimilar. For
example, although a new novel is obviously covered by the copy-
right statutes, a telephone directory, which is also a book, is not
so obviously protected. Certainly the directory appears to be the
same type of work: it is a book, and it is comprised of words
arranged by the author. Its protection under copyright statutes,
however, is problematic.
The author of a novel gains copyright protection because of
6' See 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.01[A].
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). The source of this requirement
has been alternatively seen as either the term "authors" or the term "writings" in the
copyright clause. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.01[B]. The difference in view as to the
source of the requirement does not have an impact on discussion of its terms.
'7 Gardenia Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 776, 781 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.08[B][2]. What is described here to be a separate
requirement of creativity is frequently incorporated by the courts and in the literature
under the originality requirement.
"' See 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.08[B][1]. See also Bailie v. Fisher, 258 F.2d 425,
426 (D.C. Cir. 1958). In Bailie, the court rejected plaintiff's effort to obtain copyright
protection for a "cardboard star with a circular center bearing the photograph of an
entertainer." Id. at 426. Superimposed on the center was a transparent phonograph rec-
ord. "The cardboard [star had] two flaps, which when folded back enabled it to stand up
for display." Id. The court held that the work was not the result of the artistic input that
is required under the statute.
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the intellectual efforts involved in deciding what events to in-
clude, in what sequence they will be presented, and what words
will be used to describe the events. The arrangement and choice
of the words used in the directory, on the other hand, are gener-
ally not the result of any intellectual choice on the part of the
author. Telephone directories are typically arranged in alphabet-
ical order and they typically include words that are dictated by
the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the individuals
listed. Thus, the directory is not the result of the same creative
effort as the novel and is not clearly protectable.
The creativity requirement has also proven troublesome in
the field of photography in which, as with factual compilations,
the photograph often reflects facts in the most accurate form
possible. In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,00 the de-
fendant sought to challenge the plaintiff's copyright of a photo-
graph of Oscar Wilde, arguing that the plaintiff had simply re-
produced Wilde's image on paper and that no artistic or creative
input was involved as the process was a purely mechanical one.70
The Supreme Court rejected the argument stating that it need
not address the issue of whether all photographs were copyright-
able because the Wilde picture contained elements of creativity;
the photographer had given "visual form" to his "mental con-
ception" of Wilde by posing him, selecting and arranging the
costume, light, and shade. 11 The question still unresolved is
whether a photograph is protectable when its image is not the
result of some deliberate choice of the photographer, such as a
photograph taken inadvertently while the photographer was ad-
vancing a new roll of film.72
Most courts have engaged in only limited scrutiny when de-
termining whether a work has the requisite creativity, reasoning,
as Justice Holmes did in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic
Co., that it is not the role of a judge to determine the quality of
:9 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
0 Id. at 59.
" Id. at 59-60.
72 The case which came closest to addressing this issue is Time v. Bernard Gels
Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In that case the defendant argued that the
Zapruder pictures of the Kennedy assassination were not protectable because they did
not have the required artistic input. The court held that although Zapruderes creative
input might not have been substantial, Zapruder had made sufficient choices about film,
camera, and angle to warrant protection. Id. at 141-44.
1986]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
art."' Thus, the type and level of artistic or creative input re-
quired of the author has been minimal. 4
The requirement is not entirely without substance, however,
and courts have at times found that a particular writing is not
sufficiently creative.7 5 For example, fragmentary words or
phrases,7" works such as forms whose arrangement or wording is
dictated by their content, and works in which the form is arbi-
trary,77 have been denied protection.78 When denying protection
to these types of works, the courts have often reasoned that the
author has not added the requisite creative input because the
expression used in the writing was necessitated by the subject
matter.
73 See 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903). Justice Holmes stated:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [art], outside of the narrow-
est and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be
sure to miss appreciation. . . . At the other end, copyright would be denied to
[works] which appealed to a public less educated than the judge.
Id.
" See, e.g., Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman Co., 433 F.2d 409, 411 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 977 (1971) (although plhintiff's lace designs are "not
what the phrase 'work of art' ordinarily calls to mind," there is "an appreciable amount
of creative skill and judgment"); Dan Kasoff, Inc. v. Novelty Jewelry Co., Inc., 309 F.2d
745, 746 (2d Cir. 1962) (copyright on plaintiff's "garish trinket" is valid, regardless of the
quality of the artistic input); PPS, Inc. v. Jewelry Sales Representatives, Inc., 392 F.
Supp. 375, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (plaintiffs "I Like You" apple jewelry meets minimal
level of creativity required).
"' See, e.g., Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980)
(plaintiff's reproduction of cartoon characters as plastic figures merely required "manu-
facturing skill"); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976) (con-
version of Uncle Sam bank from metal to plastic result of the "physical skill" of the
author and therefore not protected); Gardenia Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc.,
280 F. Supp. 776, 780-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (although degree of creativity required not
high, plaintiff's arrangement of flowers in artificial corsages not sufficiently creative).
In works which are based in very substantial part on other works, for example, cop-
ies of paintings, collages of other works, the courts have sometimes required a greater
level of input than might be required with a new work. See, e.g., Gracen v. Bradford
Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983) (higher level of creativity is necessary to prevent
overlapping claims).
78 See, e.g., Kanover v. Marsk, 91 U.S.P.Q. 370, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
77 See Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986).
18 See, e.g., John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 971-72 (11th
Cir. 1983) (plaintiff's "Memory Stub," a checkbook stub designed to permit individual to
carry checks around without checkbook and keep record of written checks hald not suffi.
ciently original or creative); Donald v. Varco Business Forms, 478 F.2d 764, 766 (8th Cir.
1973) (plaintiff's legal forms merely compilation of other forms insufficiently creative to
warrant protection). The Copyright Office's regulations do not permit the registration of
similar works. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(c) (1985).
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The creativity requirement is a substantial stumbling block
for authors of factual compilations. As discussed above, the ar-
rangement of the material and the particular words chosen to
reveal the data are often dictated by the subject matter. Thus,
for example, in the case of the automobile guide discussed
above679 the author has little choice as to the words that may be
chosen to describe the automobiles, and has no, or no practical
choice as to what arrangement will be used. The author's crea-
tive input is not self-evident.
C. Originality, Creativity and the Moody's and Eckes Cases
The principal problems in evaluating factual compilations
have been the identification of the intellectual effort which pro-
vides the basis for protection and the determination of how
much copying of the compilation is permissible. In Mfoody's and
Eckes, the Second Circuit described its view of the intellectual
labor that is necessary for protection under the 1976 Act and
adopted a position which extends only limited protection to fac-
tual compilations.8 0 It held that the compilation may be pro-
7 See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra.
80 This position is consistent with a number of decisions of the Second Circuit in
which, in a variety of circumstances, it has permitted extensive use of factual material in
the works of others. For example, in Hoehling v. Universal City Studio3, 618 F.2d 972
(2d Cir. 1980), the author of a book about the Hindenberg dirigible aserted that the
copyright on his book had been infringed by a television screenplay on the same subject.
According to the author, the screenplay incorporated not only the uncontested facts but
also the sequence of events in the book and his theory about who had sabotaged the
Hindenberg. The court held that "interpretations (of historical events) are not copy-
rightable as a matter of law." Id. at 978-79. But see Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall
Street Transcripts Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1977) (copying plaintiff's theories
and analyses held impermissible), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978).
Similarly, in Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966),
the court permitted a biographer of Howard Hughes to make extensive use of magazine
articles about Hughes, applying the fair use doctrine. See also Lake v. Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 707, 708-09 (S.D. Cal. 1956) ("historical fact and
events in themselves are in the public domain and are not entitled to copyright
protection").
In Oxford Book Co. v. College Entrance Book Co., 98 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1938), the
Second Circuit found that the similarity in the selection of historical events and the
commentary on the events contained in plaintiffs and defendant's history texts could
not be grounds for a charge of infringement. It reasoned that the similarities were the
result of a shared subject matter and audience, elementary school students, rather than
any impermissible copying. 98 F.2d at 691.In contrast, the Seventh Circuit has generally permitted much less extensive use of
factual materials contained in copyrighted works of others. For example, in Toksvig v.
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tected only if the author has exercised some selectivity in choos-
ing the data or the manner in which it will be described or has
arranged the data in a distinctive way. The court rejected the
view that the intellectual effort expended in collecting or coordi-
nating data into a single work was sufficient by itself to warrant
protection."1
Both the baseball guide in Eckes and the bond cards and
annual cumulative volume in Moody's were listings of factual in-
formation whose arrangement was dictated by the subject mat-
ter. The baseball cards listed in the Guide were arranged by
manufacturer; the data contained on the bond cards and in the
annual volume were arranged by issuer. In neither of the works
was the manner of arrangement particularly insightful or crea-
tive; any author producing works on these subjects would proba-
bly have independently decided to use a similar arrangement.
Moreover, in the Moody's case, and to a lesser extent in the
Eckes case, the authors exercised little selective judgment about
the content of the writings. The bond cards and annual volume
purported to cover all called bonds and included only the obvi-
ously significant information about the bonds, e.g., name of is-
suer, and redemption date. The Guide listed all baseball cards
made during the designated period and also included only infor-
mation which was of obvious importance about each card, e.g.,
manufacturer and player.
In both Eckes and Moody's, the defendants claimed that
their copying was permissible because the works that they had
copied were not deserving of copyright protection because the
plaintiff's efforts in producing the subject works did not meet
minimum levels of originality and creativity. In both cases the
Second Circuit turned to the definition of compilation in the
1976 Act to ascertain which of the intellectual efforts involved in
producing a compilation warranted protection and then sought
to determine whether any of these elements were present in the
Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950), the plaintiff had spent several years
researching and writing a biography of Hans Christian Anderson which the defendant
author had made extensive use of writing her own biography of Anderson. The court
held the use to be infringing because the defendant author had conductcd only limited
research of her own. Id. at 667. The Toksvig decision has received some criticism as
being unduly restrictive. See, e.g., Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365,
1371-72 (5th Cir. 1981); Gorman, supra note 54, at 588-89.
s Moody's, 751 F.2d at 506; Eckes, 736 F.2d at 862-63.
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disputed works.82
The 1976 Act defines a compilation as "a work formed by
the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data
that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that
the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of au-
thorship.""' In Eckes, the court focused on the term "selected"
and held that copyright protection could extend to intellectual
effort involved in selecting material to be included in a compila-
tion." The Eckes court found the plaintiff's designation of some
of the baseball cards as premium cards and others as common
cards to be a selection that warranted copyright. In doing so, the
court rejected what it termed the "sweat of a researcher's brow"
theory, i.e., that the intellectual effort involved in collecting the
data was itself sufficient basis to provide copyright protection."
The plaintiffs in Eckes were successful in their claim because
the defendants had copied only the premium cards and thus had
copied the plaintiff's selection, a protectable element.
In evaluating the copyrightability of the bond cards the
court in Moody's turned, as it did in Eckes, to the 1976 Act's
definition of compilation and applied the standard it had devel-
oped in Eckes - the author's work must demonstrate some dis-
tinctive selectivity or distinctive arrangement. 0 In Moody's no
similar element of selectivity was clearly present. FII purported
to report on all of the bonds due to be called and made no effort
to distinguish between the bonds. The analysis was further com-
plicated by the fact that Moody's had copied the bond cards and
not the cumulative volume. Though the court seemed to concede
that the cumulative volume was copyrightable, 1 it was troubled
by the possibility that protection could be extended to the bond
cards themselves.88 The court did not explain what element of
82 751 F.2d at 506; 736 F.2d at 862.
- 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (emphasis added). For full text of the provision, see note
94 infra.
84 736 F.2d at 862-63.
8Id. This conclusion was not necessary to its decision inasmuch as the author in
Eckes had clearly demonstrated selectivity. Thus the question of whether the act of col-
lection constituted a protectable act did not need to be reached.
" Moody's, 751 F.2d at 505-07.
Id. at 505.
The opinion did not focus on whether to evaluate the bond cards individually or
as a collective unit - the packet mailed out each day. The difference could be significant
in determining not only whether the required type or quality of input was present, but
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creativity rendered the annual volume copyrightable.89 Its con-
clusion that the volume was copyrightable is puzzling because it
is difficult to ascertain how the cumulative volume could exhibit
the requisite type of selectivity or arrangement, without the
bond cards being similarly protectable. Nonetheless, the court
found the record to be insufficient to make a determination as to
whether FII had met the selectivity standard on the bond cards
and it remanded for further fact-finding.90
D. Analysis
The Moody's and Eckes decisions reject the view that the
intellectual effort involved in compiling information is sufficient
to constitute the required selection, coordination, or arrange-
ment under the 1976 Act. In these cases the Second Circuit ar-
ticulated a standard that requires something more of an author
before protection will be given. The standard requires that the
author make some additional qualitative judgments about the
data, for example, which people in a city are worthy of being
listed in a social register,"1 or arrange the data in some unusual
manner, such as a distinctive chart,9 2 or describe the material in
a distinctive manner - an original narrative form."'
The difficulty with the Second Circuit's position is that it
frequently will provide no protection to an author of a non-nar-
rative comprehensive factual compilation. An author whose work
has not met this standard could not even prevent a second "au-
thor" from photocopying the work and publishing it as his own.
Further, the Second Circuit's standard will provide only limited
protection for compilations that are copyrightable. Though a
also whether the quantum of creativity was sufficient to allow protection. See text ac-
companying notes 125-39 infra.
"' The decision is consistent with the court's earlier decision in Harper & Row Pub-
lishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 723 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2218
(1985). There the Second Circuit, in response to a dissent by Judge Meskill, stated with-
out explanation that compilations that consist of listings of facts, including telephone
directories, "are indisputably copyrightable as compilations." 723 F.2d at 202 n.8.
90 751 F.2d at 506.
91 See, e.g., List Pub. Co. v. Keller, 30 F. 772, 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1887) (protecting a New
York City society directory).
" See, e.g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1938) (protecting a chart for
analyzing handwritings).
'3 See, e.g., West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 176 F. 833, 838 (2d Cir.
1910) (protecting a digest of legal opinions).
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compilation might be arranged in a distinctive manner, a second
author could take data which had been collected at considerable
expense and over an extended period, and with little expense,
produce a new work arranged in a different manner. This second
work would not be an infringement under the Second Circuit's
standard. These results do not seem warranted under either the
1976 Act or the Constitution's copyright clause.
The Second Circuit's position ignores the word "coordi-
nated" in the definition of compilation in the 1976 Act." Al-
though the 1976 Act does not define coordination, the ordinary
use of the word includes the intellectual endeavor involved in
taking facts which exist in a multitude of places and in a variety
of forms and putting them in a single location. The Second Cir-
cuit has rejected such a definition.
Nothing in the legislative history of the 1976 Act suggests
that the Second Circuit's interpretation is compelled or even
correct. The 1976 House Report, which accompanied the 1976
Act as it was reported from Congress, states that, unless other-
wise indicated, the 1976 Act adopts the law as it was at the time
of its enactment. 5 The 1976 House Report does not indicate
that by including a definition of compilation in the 1976 Act
there was any congressional intent to alter the law with respect
to the copyrightability of factual compilations, and thus, pre-
sumably, Congress intended to adopt the law as it was in 1976.00
Although the two recent Second Circuit decisions suggest
otherwise, for over a century courts have found the act of collec-
tion to be an act sufficient of itself to sustain the validity of a
copyright for factual compilations. In 1879, Eaton Drone, in his
treatise The Law of Property of Intellectual Productions in
" The 1976 Act defines compilation as:
a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of
data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the result-
ing work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship. The term "com-
pilation" includes collective works.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (emphasis added).
-5 See 1976 HousE REPoRT, supra note 22, at 51.
"See id. at 57 (discussing the dichotomy between an expression and an idea, as
embodied in section 102(b)) and at 57-58 (discussing section 103 and explaining that
derivative works and compilations are covered by the 1976 Act and limiting the coverage
an author may secure for preexisting works contained in the derivative work or
compilation).
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Great Britain and the United States, commented:
The doctrine is well settled in England and the United States, that
existing materials selected from common sources, and arranged and
combined in an original and useful form, become a proper subject of
copyright. . . . Such works are often the result of industry, learning,
and good judgment, and are useful and valuable contributions to
knowledge. They are entitled to, and will receive, the same protection
extended to productions wholly original.
These principles have been judicially recognized in the case of the
following productions: general miscellaneous compilations; annota-
tions consisting of common materials; dictionaries; books of chronol-
ogy; gazetteers; itineraries, road and guide books; directories; maps
and charts; calendars; catalogues; mathematical tables; a list of
hounds; abstracts of title to lands; and collections of statistics, statu-
tory forms, recipes, and designs.9 8
Indeed, the case cited most frequently in support of the
proposition that the act of collection permits a copyright to issue
is a 1922 decision of the Second Circuit, Jeweler's Circular Pub-
lishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co.91 There the court, sus-
taining a decision of then district Judge Learned Hand, 00 stated
in dicta:
The right to copyright a book . . . does not depend upon ...
whether such materials show ... anything more than industrious col-
lection. The man who goes through the streets of a town and puts
down the names of each of the inhabitants, with their occupations and
their street number acquires material of which he is the author. He
produces by his labor a meritorious composition, in which he may ob-
tain a copyright, and thus obtain the exclusive right of multiplying
copies of his work. 10
The Jeweler's rule was followed, or had been adopted previ-
ously, by courts in the First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
17 E. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (1879) [hereinafter DRONE]. Drone's treatise has
been cited on numerous occasions by the Supreme Court as an authorititive source on
copyright law. E.g., Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 651
(1943); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1907); Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographics Co., 188 U.S. 250 (1902) (referring to Drone's commentaries noting the
copyrightability of directories).
93 DRONE, supra note 97, at 152-53 (1879 & 1972 photo reprint) (footnotes omitted).
01 281 F. 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 581 (1922).
100 274 F. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
101 281 F. at 88.
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Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits.10 2
Curiously, although the Second Circuit adopted a different
rule, it cited to Jeweler's in support of its statement that at least
some compilations are protected under the 1976 Act. The court
also referred to the case in its discussion of the elements that
validate a copyright, such as the act of collection versus qualita-
tive selection, and the competing lines of authority in this
area.
0 3
The Second Circuit's conclusion was also not compelled by
any requirement of the Constitution's copyright clause. The cre-
ativity requirement could be satisfied by recognizing that the in-
tellectual effort involved in collecting data by itself satisfies that
requirement because such an act can demonstrate "skill or judg-
ment."' 4 Facts contained in compilations are generally gathered
from widely scattered sources which are in a variety of forms.
There is skill and judgment involved in determining where the
data can be found, extracting the desired data, and ascertaining
which facts should be ultimately included in the compilation. In
some instances deciding which facts to include may not be an
act of great intellectual magnitude, but requiring a greater level
of intellectual effort on the part of compilers would be inconsis-
tent with the low standard of creativity required from authors of
other sorts of works. 105
As noted above, one of the concerns underlying the copy-
right clause is that a broad monopoly will inhibit the free use of
information. 106 Protecting the intellectual effort involved in the
"I E.g., Southern Bell Tel & TeL Co. v. Associated TeL Directory Publishers, 756
F.2d 801, 809 (11th Cir. 1985) (telephone directory); Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co.,
566 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir. 1977) (gardening directory); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nation-
wide Independent Directory Service, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 900, 905 (W.D. Ark. 1974) (tele-
phone directory); Southern Bell TeL & Tel Co., v. Donnelly, 35 F. Supp. 425, 429 (S.D.
Fla. 1940) (telephone directory); Leon v. Pacific Tel & Tel Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th
Cir. 1937) (telephone directory); Cincinnati and Suburban Bell Tel. Co. v. Brovm, 44
F.2d 631-32 (S.D. Ohio 1930) (telephone directory).
1"3 Moody's, 751 F.2d at 505.
104 See Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of
Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 516, 530 (1981).
105 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. at 244, quoted supra
note 73. See also text accompanying notes 65-79 supra.
10' See text accompanying notes 4849 supra; 1 Nimm, supra note 1, at § 2.11.
Although the Second Circuit did not discuss this issue in either Moody's or Eckes, it has
noted this concern on other occasions. See, e.g., Miller v. Universal City Studios, 650
F.2d 1365, 1369-70 (5th Cir. 1981); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972, 978
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collection of data need not result in unduly restricting the use of
ideas and facts contained in compilations. First, a second author
will always be free to independently collect the data and pro-
duce a similar work. Second, copying the data in a copyrighted
work could be allowed by setting a standard that permits fairly
extensive use of the data, especially when the second author has
added substantial materials of his own or has significantly al-
tered the form of the work. Third, fairly extensive use of the
first work could be permitted under the fair use doctrine.10 7
The Seventh Circuit has taken a strong position in support
of the collection theory. In its most significant decision on point,
Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co.,108 the plaintiffs sued for an
infringement of their copyright on a directory of suppliers of
items useful to gardeners. There was no evidence that the plain-
tiff author had exercised any judgment or skill in choosing or
arranging the information in her work. On the contrary, the re-
ported evidence suggests that to the extent her resources al-
lowed, she intended her work to be a comprehensive listing of
the field and that the arrangement of the materials was "not
novel or original."10 9 The defendant had published a book on
gardening covering a variety of matters and incorporated infor-
mation from the plaintiff's book. The defendant's entries on
each supplier were briefer than the plaintiff's, and in both books
the materials on suppliers were similarly arranged. The Seventh
Circuit found the copying to be impermissible, stating that "only
'industrious collection,' not originality in the sense of novelty is
required to find a work copyrightable."110
The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its language in Schroeder in
Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Service Company of
Colorado, Inc.,"" noting that a copyright "depended on the fact
that the compiler made a contribution - a new arrangement or
presentation of facts - and not on the amount of time the work
consumed. 11 2 The court stressed that the author in Rockford
"made a contribution" by digging through public records and
(2d Cir. 1980).
107 See note 22 supra (discussing fair use doctrine).
108 566 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977).
10' Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 421 F. Supp. 372, 374-75 (N.D. II. 1976).
110 Schroeder, 566 F.2d at 5.
121 768 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 806 (1986).
"I Id. at 149.
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presenting in its maps the information its search revealed. The
court noted that "teasing pictures from the debris left by con-
veyancers is a substantial change in the form of the
information."113
The Schroeder decision has been interpreted by the district
courts in the Seventh Circuit as endorsing the view that the act
of collection can be sufficient to provide the basis for a copy-
right. Utilizing this standard, those courts have found road
maps, mileage tables" and business directories " 5 copyrightable.
In addition, the limited protection provided under the Sec-
ond Circuit rule cannot be justified by the possibility that au-
thors may obtain relief under state unfair competition/misap-
propriation law.1"' In many jurisdictions unfair competition/
misappropriation laws are applied in a much narrower range of
circumstances than federal copyright laws. For example, in some
jurisdictions parties must be competitors before a claim can be
sustained, and the courts have narrowly interpreted the term
competitors."1 The federal copyright statutes are not similarly
restricted in their application. Most importantly, relief under
state unfair competition/misappropriation law is unavailable if it
is found that such claims are preempted under section 301 of the
1978 Act. '8
113 Id.
"" See, e.g., Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Systems, Inc., 600 F. Supp.
933, 937-40 (N.D. IlL 1984) (maps and mileage tables).
"ll See, e.g., National Business Lists v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 59, 94
(N.D. Ill. 1982) (reference works on businesses and their employees).
116 See note 19 supra for a discussion of unfair competition/misappropriation
claims. Indeed, the plaintiff in Moody's brought a state unfair competition claim as well
as a copyright claim. 751 F.2d at 502.
M See note 19 supra.
11 Under section 301 of the 1976 Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982), state protection ex-
tending to works within the subject matter of the federal copyright statute is preempted
if it provides for rights that are equivalent to those granted under the 1976 Act. It is not
clear whether unfair competition/misappropriation claims are preempted.
In four cases decided prior to the adoption of section 301, the Supreme Court con-
sidered the issue of federal preemption of state intellectual property claims. In Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1984) (federal patent preemption) and
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1984) (same), the Supreme
Court held that state remedies proscribing copying were preempted when they pro-
scribed copying that was permitted under federal law. The reach of these decisions,
which seemed to preclude almost all state remedies covering intellectual properties, was
limited by Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (federal copyright preemption),
and Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (federal patent preemption).
In Goldstein, the Court permitted state regulation of sound recordings which, at that
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As noted above, the Second Circuit's rule is also troubling
insofar as it will permit extensive copying of a factual compila-
tion. Under its reasoning, only the distinctive selection or ar-
rangement warrants protection and if that element is not copied,
there would be no violation. Thus, in the Eckes case, if the de-
fendants had copied all of the cards and not used merely the
"premium" or "star" cards, there would be no infringement.
Further, if an arrangement of the data was the only copyright-
able element, a new work which copied all of the data in a new
arrangement would be permissible. Either of these results would
reduce the author's potential for economic reward and, there-
time, were not covered by the federal copyright statute. The Court held that as to sound
recordings, "Congress [had] drawn no balance; rather it [had] left the area unattended"
and thus the states were free to regulate. 412 U.S. at 570. In Kewanee Oil, the Court
held that the state regulation at issue was permissible, even though the federal law cov-
ered the works in question. The Court reasoned that the state law did not "clash" with
the federal statute, that the state law sought to regulate different yet compatible objec-
tives, and, thus, the state law was not preempted. 416 U.S. at 491-93. These cases were
deemed to have permitted state unfair competition/misappropriation remedies. See gen-
erally Dannay, The Sears-Compco Doctrine Today: Trademarks and Unfair Competi-
tion, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 132 (1976).
Under section 301 of the 1976 Act, the federal copyright statute contains, for the
first time, an explicit statement on preemption. It is unclear to what extent section 301
alters prior law and whether state misappropriation claims in cases such as Moody's are
proscribed. The legislative history is unclear. The Department of Justice had lobbied for
omission of misappropriation claims from a list of permissible state claims to be included
in section 301. That list was subsequently deleted and it is unclear whether the deletion
was the result of the Justice Department's successful lobbying or a compromise that
simply left the issue unresolved. See Note, The Misappropriation Doctrine After the
Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 81 DicK. L. REv. 469, 487-90 (1977). Some commentators
have suggested that misappropriation claims would be preempted inasmuch as the sub-
ject matter, factual compilations, are the subject of the federal statutes and the 1976 Act
has left such works available for public use. See, e.g., Denicola, supra note 104, at 517-18
n.7. Others have argued that federal copyright protection does not extend to factual
compilations per se and thus state protection is not preempted. 1 NIMMEn, supra note 1,
§ 1.01[B][2][b]. See generally Mitchell, Misappropriation and the New Copyright Act:
An Overview, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. Rv. 587 (1980).
The Second Circuit appears to have accepted the later view. In Moody's it held that
if FiIs copyright claim was valid, the state claim would be preempted, 751 F.2d at 510,
apparently reasoning that the two remedies would cover the same subject matter and
provide equivalent rights. It further held, however, that if FII's copyright claim did not
prevail, "the state claim [would] have to be considered," suggesting that the claims
would not be preempted. Id. See also Roy Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz v. CBS,
672 F.2d 1095, 1106 n.19 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982). But see Warner
Bros. v. American Broadcasting Companies, 720 F.2d 231, 247 (2d Cir. 1983) ("state law
claims that rely on the misappropriation branch of unfair competition are preempted").
Indeed, the district court on remand held that FII's state claim was preempted. FIi/Dist.
Ct. III, No. 81 Civ. 6001, slip op. at 11 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 1986).
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fore, seem inconsistent with the copyright clause's goal of en-
couraging the production of writing by economic incentive.
E. The Quantum of Selectivity, Coordination, and Arrange-
ment Required
Another issue in Moody's was the quantitative level of crea-
tivity. The copyright statutes have required not only a certain
minimum quality of creative input, but also a minimum quan-
tity of creative input as well. As District Judge Wyzanski stated
in Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England Newspaper Pub-
lishing Co.:
To constitute a copyrightable compilation, a compendium must ordi-
narily result from the labor of assembling, connecting and categorizing
disparate facts which in nature occurred in isolation. A compilation, in
short, is a synthesis. It is rare indeed that an analysis of any one
actual occurrence could be regarded as compilation. For an account
of a single event to be subject to copyright, it must have individuality
of expression or must reflect peculiar skill and judgment.1"
Thus, for example, although a telephone directory could be val-
idly copyrighted, a copyright could not be issued for a piece of
paper which merely stated: "Doe, John, 123 Main St, 555-5151."
This "writing" would not meet the quantum of creative input
required by the statute, under either the coordination theory or
the selectivity theory.
Although no bright-line rule has been or should be estab-
lished to determine whether the quantity of creativity is suffi-
cient, there are a variety of factors which could be considered
when a determination is made. Consideration might be given to
factors such as the size of the writing, whether the expression is
highly unusual or distinctive, and whether others contemplating
the subject would be likely to produce a similar result. A court
could review as well whether the writing reflects any unusual co-
ordination of facts, what form the data was in prior to its compi-
lation, how intellectually difficult it was to locate the data, and
the extent of the labor involved in producing the work. 20
11 46 F. Supp. 198, 201 (D. Mass. 1942) (emphasis added).
110 See, e.g., Rand McNally & Co v. Fleet Management Systems, Inc., 600 F. Supp.
933, 934-40 (N.D. Il. 1984) (data collected from city, county, and state maps; however,
Rand McNally manipulated information to obtain accurate mileage and updated mileage
data).
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It was not clear during the appeal in Moody's whether FII
had exercised the requisite type or quantity of intellectual input
in producing any individual bond card for the card to be copy-
rightable under either the standard announced by the Second
Circuit or under the collection theory. Although the plaintiff in-
troduced evidence on this issue during the remand, the district
court analyzed this issue largely on the basis of information sub-
mitted during the first hearing. It appears from the court's deci-
sion that the information on each card was gathered principally
from a single source, a call notice or tombstone in a newspaper.
In some instances, the FII staff found it necessary to check the
information or collect additional information from another
source.121 As the district court correctly held, the effort was in-
sufficient to warrant protection under the selectivity theory.122
The district court on remand did not evaluate FII's coordinative
effort. The evidence reported in the opinion, however, suggests
that no significant coordinative effort was required to produce
any single bond card. If so, the coordinative effort would be min-
imal and the bond cards would not be individually
copyrightable. 123
Also left unresolved was the question of whether the pack-
ets of bond cards mailed on a daily basis to subscribers con-
tained an adequate amount of selectivity or coordination to be
copyrighted.124 The record on appeal and on remand is insuffi-
cient to provide a resolution of this issue as well. It does appear
as if some coordinative effort was involved; the call notices were
not published in any single place and FII had to make determi-
nations as to which resources should be reviewed or contacted in
order to transform the various notices into its bond cards.
III. SERIALIZATION
The plaintiff in Moody's argued, and the district court
agreed, that the copyrightability of the bond cards should be
' FII/Dist. Ct. III, slip op. at 7.
122 Id. at 7-8.
'" See Exhibit 1-1980 N. 4, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment, Financial Information Inc. v. Moody's, 751 F.2d 50 (2d
Cir. 1984).
121 It should be noted that there is no evidence in either the district or circuit court
opinions that FII made any effort to obtain A copyright on the packets of cards. Thus it
would be unlikely that the packets could be protected under the facts of the case.
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viewed in light of the existence of FH's annual volume. Under
this reasoning, because the annual volume could be copyrighted,
and it was produced by compiling the cards, the bond cards
could gain their copyright protection from the annual volume
even if the individual bond cards could not be copyrighted
standing by themselves. The district court noted:
In amassing its bond data [for the annual volume], FII is not just as-
sembling a handful of statistics about a single, solitary occurrence, but
is instead weaving together into a handy, coherent entity thousands of
facts .... To accord copyright protection to the annual compilation
but deny it to each daily component would negate the value of the
protection accorded the yearly compilation .... Just as an annual
aggregation of called bond data should be considered a compilation,
so, too should each serial ingredient.'" 5
The Second Circuit did not resolve this issue noting that
the evidence in the record did not reveal whether the annual
cumulative volume served any real purpose. 20 On remand the
district court found that the volume served only a historical or
preservation function.127 As noted above, information about
bond redemptions is generally utilized before the redemption.
After the redemption date, interest is not paid. The annual vol-
ume, therefore, has no real significant purpose. The packets of
bond cards were not merely steps in the creation of a larger end
product but were the end product themselves. The district court
correctly found that FH should not be able to gain a copyright
on an otherwise uncopyrightable work by production of a useless
volume.
Even if the annual volume served a legitimate function, it
would be inconsistent with much of the copyright law to permit
published bond cards (or packets of bond cards) to gain a copy-
right merely because they were later collected into an annual
volume. The point of publication is a significant event in the life
of a writing. It is at this juncture that the author has chosen to
make his writing public, to reveal his private decision-making, to
relinquish his ability to change or alter the work, to distribute it
to the public, to receive a financial reward for the work and to
relinquish physical control over copies. It is at this point that
2,5 FIIDist. Ct. I, 599 F. Supp. at 998.
128 Moody's, 751 F.2d at 507.
" FII/Dist. Ct. III, slip op. at 8-9.
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copyrightability should be determined, not later.
In a variety of circumstances, the point at which a work is
published has been found to be an event of considerable legal
significance when determining the nature or extent of the pro-
tection an author has in his work. For example, in Harper &
Row v. Nation Enterprises128 the Supreme Court, in evaluating
the range of permissible fair use 129 of President Ford's autobiog-
raphy, gave considerable significance to the fact that Ford had
not yet published the work. The Court was apparently quite
concerned that the use of his materials substantially reduced the
economic return which would be available upon publication.130
Similarly, in Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover,'3' the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia found the public distri-
bution of the speeches of Admiral Rickover sufficient to divest
him of common law copyright.132
The physical transfer of the writing in return for considera-
tion is also recognized in caselaw and statute as the point at
which the author loses the right to control sales of that copy of
the writing and loses as well the right to prevent the destruction
or physical alteration of that copy. 3 3 Furthermore, an author
cannot generally secure a copyright on those component parts of
a compilation that were in the public domain when he publishes
a larger work containing this public domain material. 34 When
128 105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985).
12 See note 22 supra for a discussion of the doctrine of fair use.
130 105 S. Ct. at 2234.
21 284 F.2d 262, 270-71 (D.C. Cir. 1960), judgment vacated on other grounds, 369
U.S. 111 (1962), on remand, 268 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1967).
132 Id. See also American Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 239 F.2d 740, 744 (2d Cir. 1956);
Atlantic Monthly Co. v Post Publishing Co., 27 F.2d 556, 559 (D. Mass. 1928).
1 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3) [ex-
clusive right to distribute], the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord ... is entitled,
without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the posses-
sion of that copy or phonorecord."). See also Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Elliott Pub-
lishing Co., Inc., 46 F. Supp. 717, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (defendant may purchase second-
hand copies of plaintiff's comics and bind them together with other comics and sell with
the words "Double Comics" thereon). But see Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Compa-
nies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 23-24 (2d Cir. 1976) (preventing alterations of a copy of a work
under the 1976 Act and section 43(a) of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)) (1982); CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(c) (West 1986) (limiting ability of owner of a copy
of a work of fine art to alter or destroy copy); N.Y. Arts and Cultural Affairs Law § 14-03
Gen. Bus.- Law (McKinney Supp. 1985) (limiting owner's ability to display an altered
copy of a work of fine art).
1-' 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1982). See 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 22, at 57-58.
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an author has treated the components in a manner that results
in their entering into public circulation, no different result
should accrue merely because he intends to place the segments
in a larger compilation which would receive a copyright.
The publication of Fil's bond cards caused a number of sig-
nificant events to occur: the cards were made public; decisions as
to content and any necessary selection or coordination could no
longer be altered; the bond cards were distributed widely; FII
received compensation for its sale of the cards; and the subscrib-
ers to the Bond Service were free to retain or destroy the cards.
These significant events suggest that the copyrightability of the
bond cards should be determined at the point of publication
rather than at some future time, such as when an annual volume
is published.
The Moody's case is very similar to Holmes v. Hurst,13 a
case that involved The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table, a book
by Oliver Wendell Holmes. Holmes had published portions of
the work in twelve successive volumes of the magazine The At-
lantic Monthly. No copyright was secured on any of the issues
of the magazine and no copyright was registered on Holmes's
work until after the entire work had been published. The de-
fendant had copied and sold portions of the book.' The issue in
the case was whether the prior serial publication of the book
nullified the attempts to secure a copyright for the book. The
Court noted that the copyright attached "to that arrangement of
words which the author ha[d] selected to express his ideas,"
which he alone had the right to determine, and that copyright
attaches to those words, if at all, at the point at which he chose
to publish his work.' 37 The Court held that the author could not
secure a copyright on his book after he had published his work,
even when serially published.138 Similarly, F11 should not receive
a copyright for its bond cards merely because of its later efforts
to obtain copyright protection after the cards have been
published.
The district court in Moody's was concerned that unless the
bond cards were copyrightable someone would be able to legally
I" 174 U.S. 82 (1899).
IM Id. at 84.
137 Id. at 86-87.
2M Id. at 89.
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copy a work in progress. That result would not necessarily be
inevitable. Generally, an author will not reveal or publish his
work until produced in a copyrightable form. Prior to that time
the author's right of first publication will protect him from a
copier.183
FII chose to publish small segments of its annual volume
and to reap the financial benefits of early publication. If those
segments are too small to warrant protection, FII should bear
the cost of such a decision, namely the loss of copyright.
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit's decisions in FII v. Moody's and Eckes
v. Card Prices Update have substantially limited the ability of
authors of comprehensive compilations to receive copyright pro-
tection, thus limiting their ability to prevent others from copy-
ing their works. The decisions are not mandated by the 1976
Act, the U. S. Constitution, or prior caselaw. The route the Sec-
ond Circuit has chosen is unfortunate. By severely restricting
the copyright protection afforded factual compilations, the court
has reduced the financial awards ordinarily available to those
producing comprehensive works.
In the future, authors of comprehensive works may well
hesitate to devote the time and energy so necessary to the pro-
duction of this type of work. The inexorable result can only be
significant erosion of the federal copyright statute's mandate to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts. ' 140
-31 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1982). See also Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 105 S.
Ct. at 2232-33.
140 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
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